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LIABILITY OF MEMBERS OF A DE FACTO CORPOR \TION.
A private corporation, like a co-partnership, is a
voluntary association of individuals; but business corporations
of limited liability were unknown to the cor~mon law ( 'kI Black.
Com. 172 ), and therefore, unlike a co-partnership, can legall:
exist only wh-ien authorized by the state. The right of acting
in a corporate capacity, with all the rigts and privileges in-
cidert thereto, must be treated as a franchise, which may not
be assumed without a grant of authority from the governing power.
In the United States such anthority is derived from the legisla-
ture, either through a special charter or a general incorpora-
tion law. These charters and general laws usually prescribe
certain conditions and formalities to be complied with bl: par-
ties wishing to incorporate under them, the due observance of
which is ordinarily a condition precedent to the legal incorpora-
tion 6f a company. Thus, it is usually required as a prelir-
inary step that a certificate of certain fbrm, containing cer-
tain information and signed by the corporators, shall be filed
in the office of the secretary of state. See R.S.of Ohio,
§§ 3236-3239 ). Such a condition as this is undoubtedly a con-
dition precedent, and it frequently becomes a matter of much
nicety, requiring the greatest discrimination in the applica-
tio:n of legal principles, to determine the status of an organi-
2.
zation, and the liability f its members, formed and doing baSi-
ness ostensibly under the authority of the general statute, but
having failed, through inadvertence or otherwise, to comply with
those conditions, either in whole or in part. Are such condi-
tions an absolute pre-requisite to incorporation so that the stock-
holders of such an organization may be held to their commron law
liability as co-partners, or may they still enjoy the rights and
imunities of a properly existing carporation ?
Such an association may exist in two aspects : first,
where a bona fide atternt has been ciade in good faith to comply
with the statute, but through the inadvertence or carelessne3s
of the promoters the strtict letter of the law has not been observ-
ed ; and, secondly, where no such attempt ,.as been made and the
exercise of corporate functions is a bare usurpation of powers,
wholly without authority or color of law. I shall discuss these
classes separately, endeavoring first to determine the liability
of the stockholders on the contracts of the concern, and then the
liability for its torts.
Bona Fide Attempt to Incorporate ; Contract Liability.
As stated above, neither a private corporation nor a
co-partnership with limited liability was known at common law.
Individuals associated togetheri in any enterprise for pr'ivate
gain were individually liable for all debts contracted by the
3.
association within the scope of the business, anu such liability
could not be abridged by any acts or declarations of their own.
Prima facie, therefore, such would be the liability of the mer-
bers of any association to-ciay, and where they claim exemption
from payment beyond a certain amount of a claim arising from its
contracts that exemption must arise in one of two ways ; it
must be an especial privilege granted by the state, or it must
arise from the terms of the contract itself. Nlow, the stat-
ute having prescribed certain conditions precedent to legal in-
corporation and the consequent limitation of liability, and these
conditions not having been performedthey. cannot, of eurse,
derive any exemption from statutory authority, That proposi-
tion is self-evicient. Therefore, if exempted at all, the ex-
emption niust grow out of the contract, arem the terms of each
contract upon which they are sought to be held must be examined
for itself. The matter must be looked at thus : What were
the terms of the contract ? Upon what did the minds of the
contracting parties meet ? What was their mutual intent ion
aid expectation as to liability I Did the creditor contract
with reference to a limited liability, or was the actual exis-
tence de jure of the corporation implied as an essential part
of the contract ? It seems that these questions being sat-
isfactorily answered the whole problemn will be solved.
Pursuing these inquiries we see that the concern has
held out that it is a corporation; that its members will not be
liable beyond a certain amount; and that those who deal with it
must deal upon that basis. With that understanding and expec-
tation a creditor has dealt with it. Subsequently it is discov-
ered that through an oversight some formality in the act of in-
corporation has been omitted. It is certain that neither the
corporation nor the stockholders can set this up to avoid the
contract, for the law will not permit them to thus take advantage
of their own wrong.(a) Nor can a subscriber for stock when sued
for calls.(b) And neither does this newly discovered fact in
any way alter the position or prejudice the rights of the cred-
itor. It does not matter what the actual status of the asso-
ciation may 6e. It has assumed to enter into a contract in
a corporate capacity and for only a corporate liability, and
a party dealing with it upon that assumption cannot afterward
be heard to deny the terms of his own contract. It is but
an application of the familiar principle of estoppel, and is
(a) Ins.Co. v. Horner,17 Ohio,407. (b) R.R.Co. v. Cary,26 1.Y. 75.
De Groff v. Am.Thread Co.21,N.Y.124. Casey v.Galli,94 U.S.673.
Eaton v. Aspinwall,19 N.Y.119.
Dobson v. Simonton,86 1T.C.,492.
Water Co. v. De 'Kay, 36 NJ.Er1 .,548.
Holbrook v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. ,25 K'inn.,229.
equally true whether the association was in fact a corporation
or not; or whether the contract was v-thorized by the legisla-
ture or without that authority and altogeth r prohibited by law.
It is clear that the members of the association never agreed to
be bound as partners, to become individually liable, either with
the creditor or arong themselves, It is equally clear that
the party contracting with the association never intended to con-
tract with its members individually. Hence, to treat the
members as individually.liable would not only nullify the con-
tract actually contenplated and entered into, but would create
and enforce an entirely differert contract which neither of the
parties thereto ever intended to make. This conclusion, so
clearly arrived at, is undoubtedly supported by the great weight
of athority. The first case that I find involving this prop-
osition is the English of Henriques v. Dutch West India Co.,
2 Ld.Ray. ,1535,decided about 1730, in which it was held that
"where an action is brought by a corporation they need not show
how they were incorporated for if the name is proper for a
corporation the nane argues a a) rporation," and that "the plain-
tiffs were estopped by their recognizance to say there was no
such company." And the law thus enunciated has been adopted
in New York(a) ad Ohio(b), and in nearly every state in the
Union.(c) In a very early New York case ( 3 Sand. ,170 ) it
is said, "A defendant who has contracted with a corporation
de facto is never permitted to allege any defect in its organi-
zation as affecting its capacity to contract or sue ; but all
sixh objections, if valid, are only available on behalf of t1V
sovereign power of the state* . .It would be in the highest
degree inequitable and unjust to permit him to rescind a con-
tract, the fruits of which he retains and never br cormelledtAo
restore." Such is the holding uniformly in the subsequent
New York cases. This prevailing doctrine is concisely stated
by AshburneJ. in Newburg Petroleum Co. v. Weare,27 Oh.St.,at
page 354 :
"As a general rule a party will be concluded from denying
his own acts or admissions which are designed to, and dD
influence the conduct of another, and when such denial wil
operate to the actual\ injury of that other person.....Good
faith requires that a person who has recognized the existence
(a) Conmercial Bk. v. Pfeiffer,108 N.Y. ,242.
White v. Ross,15 Abb.Pr.,66.
Dutchess M1an'g Co. v. Davis,14 John. ,245.
(b) Hagerman v. Ohio B. & S. Association,25 Oh.St.,186.
Petroleum Co. v. Weare,27 Oh.St., 343.
(c) Canal Co. v. Warner,14 Pac.Rep.,37,and cases cited in note.
Lumber Co. v. Ward,3 S.E.Rep.,227,and cases cited in note.
Fay v. Noble,7 Cush.188 ; BK. v. McDonald,130 1 ss,264 ;
Bank v. Palmer,47 Conn.,443 ; Comm'rs v. Bolles,94 U.S.,104.
Contra. Kaiser v. Bank.56 Ia,.104,
"of a corporation by dealing with it openly, with full
knowledge of its business character, is yet in the enjoy-
ment of the fruits of the transaction wit. it under th-e con-
tract, should be estopped from denying in this collateral
way, the power of the corporation to enter into the contract'
With this principle in view, it has been held that failure to
rcoi-d duplicate of certificate with the county cl erk(a),to file
a duplicate of the articles of association with the secretary of
state(b),to state in the certificate the prirp.place of bu-
siness(c),acknowledgment of certificate before a notary public
instead of before a justice of the peace(d),and failure of notary
to certify that those signing the articles of incorporation were
personally known to him(e),are not such irregularities as will
invalidate the existence of a corporation as to corporate cred-
itors. The only one whose rirhts have been violated in such
case3 is the state under whose authority it is sought to ircor-
porate, and hence the due incorporation carnmot be inquired into
collaterally, but must be attacked in a separate proceeding
which is usually a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the
(a) Hir.phreys v. M-ooney,5 Col.,283 .
(b) Cross v. M"Jill Co.,17 Ill.,54.
(c) In re Spring Valley W.W.Co.,17 Cal.,132.
(d) Hagerman v. Ohio B. & S. Association,25 Oh.St.,186.
(e) People v. Cheeseman, 7 Col.,370. *
8.
attorney general in behalf of the state. ( R.S.of Ohio,§ 6762 ).
Mr.Cook in his work on "Stock and Stockholders" ( §§
231-235 ) seans to doubt this doctrine, but his position seems
to me untenable. He says,
"A corporate creditor seeking to enforce the payment of his
debt may ignore the existence of the corporation, and may
proceed against the supposed stockholders as partners by
proving that the prescribed method of becoming incorporated
was not complied with by the company in question."
His reasons for his conclusion seen wholly unjustifiable.
"He(the corporate creditor) is not estopped from so doing,
since he is not repudiating a contract, but enforcing it.
The fact that he contracted with them under a cDrporate
nape is inmaterial, since, at common law, parties may carry
on business under any nane they choose."
As a matter of fact the corporate creditor seeks not only to
repudiate a contract, but to enforce a new contract which has
never been made, the terms of which have never been in the con-
tenpolaticn of the parties. Furthermore, he not only contracted
with them in the corporate name, which is perhaps immaterial,
but he contracted with them in their corporate capacity od with
the distinct understanding that theirs was to be a corporate
liability only. And the cases cited by Mr.Cook fail to sustain
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his conclusion. For example, he cites The Bank of Watertown
v.Landon, 45 N.Y.,410. In this case the defendants had ceased
to be a erporation, and were doing business, and skaring profits
and losses strictly upon a partnership basis at the time the
contract in controversy was made. And in Ridenour v. Mayo,
40 Oh. St.,9,a rather mixed up case, it seems that the trustees
of a certain savings bank, which wa3 created not so much as a
business corporation -s a benevolent institution, had acted in
their personal capacity and done nothing whatever in the execu-
tion of corporate power. The law in Ohio is well spttled con-
trary to ir. Cook's view. In fact, I am confident that every
case(a) cited against the proposition I have laid down may be
explained and distinguished, though the limits of this thesis
will not permit further dtation.
The position is furth-r strengthened by analogy in those
cases of limited partn rships in which the statutory b rmialities
have not been strictly followed. There do not seem to be many
adjudicated cases on the particular point, but from much valauble
dicta(b) I think it can be maintained that actual notice to a
party dealing v4 th the partnership that it is intended by its
members to be a limited one, will relieve the special partner
(a) Except the Iowa case.
(b) Levy v. Lock, 47 How.Pr-,394,397.
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from a general liability. This is strongly intimated in Smith
v. Argall,6 hill,479, at p.482 ; and in Medberry v. Soper,17 Kan.
369,Brewer,J.,(noa of the U.S.Supreme Court),at p.374,says :
"Where either party claims that his liability is limited by
special contract between the partners, anri no proceeding has
been had under the limited partnership act, it is essential
that notice to, or knowledge by, the creditor of such an-
tract limitation be shown, or as to him it will not exist."
In a Pennsylvania case ( Whilldin v. Bullock ),decided in 1877,
it was said, that one who sues a partnership may properly be
asked whether he did not give credit to them as a limited part-
nership ; and that if he did deal with them as such, the burden
in
is on him to how that the partners are liable asAa general
partnershir. I think the law on this point is analagous to
that of a de facto corporation, and may be thus stated : When
a party dealing with a partnership receives actual notice that
one or more partners claim a limited liability, such notice
becomes a part of the contract and he cannot afterward be heard
to dispute the liability ; but if the limited partnership statute
has not been substantially complied with, the burden of proof
to show such actual notice is Won the partner seeking exemption.
Mere knowledge by the creditor that an attempt has been made,
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or that papers for a limited partnership have been executed is
not alone sufficient ; for he cannot know but that the partners
have abandoned t1i ir design of coming under the statute.
Limitation of the Doctrine.
There appears, however, to be a tendency on the part of
some of our courts to carry the doctrine that the legal existence
of a corporation camot be attacked collaterally entirely too
far. There is a limit beyond which the law will not permit
a violation of its express provisions. Indeed, in the case of
ca express contract it is not because the law looks with favor
upon irregularities that they are tolerated, but because the
creditor's own acts and admissions estopp him from taking acvan-
tage of them ; and when a person has in no way, either expressly
or inliedly, recognized or acknowledged the corporate existence
of aa association, and has had no dealings with it as a corpora-
tion, I am unable to find any decisive aithority fbr holding that
he may not attack the legality of its existence when such exis-
tance is prejudicial to his rights. A good illustration of the
attempts to enlarge this doctrine is the case of Society Perun
v. Cleveland,43 Oh.St. ,481. Society Perun had attempted in
good faith to ina) rporate, but having failed to comply with the
statutes in some particulars was ousted from its user by a q_
war ranto rroceeding instituted by tho attorney general. The
plaintiff, the city of Cleveland, ha)ving had no direct contract
relation with defendant, and not having otherwise, expressly or
by implication, recognized its legal corpor.-te existence, claimed
that it was entitled to dispute such existence, and t~iat as to
it the society was not - corporation de facto. But the aurt
thought otherwise, basing its decision Tpon the iuea that under
no circumstances can the corporate existence of an association
be questioned collaterally ; that it can, only be attacked by
direct proceeding instituted by the state for t- at very purpose.
Owen,J.,in delivering th.e opinion,says,
"The theory that a de facto corporation has no real existence,
that it is a mere phantom to be invoked only by that ru~le of
estoppel which forbids a party who has dealt with a pre-
tended corporation to deny its corporate existence, has no
foundation, either in reason or authority. A de facto
corporation is a reality. It has an actual and substan-
tial legal existence. It is, as the term implies, a
corporation. " And further,
"Where it has been reputed and dealt with as a duly incorpora-
ted body, ad valuable rights and inte'ests have been ac-
quired and transferred by it, no substantial reason is
suggested why its corporate existence, in a suit involving
13.
"such transactions, should be subject to attack by any other
party than the state, end t1rn only when called upon in
a direct proceeding for that purpose, to show by what author-
ity it assumes to be a corporation."
These observations of the court are dicta, entirely unnecessary
to the decision of the case at bar, and while the r al decision
is undoubtedly a sound one, it is arrived at by most fallacious
reasoning. It is true that, although the plaintiff had never
dealt with defendant as a corporation, it could not be permitted
to so far impeach its existence as to disregard its transactions
made before the judgment of ouster, but not because plaintiff
could not attack its existence collaterally, An examination
of the facts discloses that Society Perun, supposing itself a
corporation, had acquired property from a previously existing
corporqtion called Perun. Presumably there was a considera-
tion. Perun had already mortgaged the property to the city of
Cleveland, but the latter had failed to have the mortgage record-
ed for more than five years. After the conveyance to Society
Perun, and before the recording of the city's mortgage, the former,
acting in its supposed coip orate capacity, from time to time
mortgaged and conveyed different parcels of these lands to various
parties. The city brought this action, pending the proceedings
in quo warranto,to foreclose her mortgage, and also to foreclose
14.
her suppos cd vendor's lien on the mortgaged premises, as against
these subsequent grantees and mortgagees. From these facts it
is apparent that the c orporate existence or non-existence of
defendant was not essential to the decision. In same capacity
or another Society Perun, or the members composing it, as the
case may be, parted with a valuable consideration and acquired
an interest in the real estate, and so far as the city of Cleve-
land was concerned it did not matter what that capacity may
have been ; whehter it was as a corporation de jure, a corpora-
tion de facto, or a co-partnership. That matter could not
affect her rights and it was wholly unnecessary fbr the court
to pass upon that question. It is not contended that Society
Perun had "no real existence", that it was a "mere phantom". It
undoubtedly had "an actual and substantial legal existence", as
Judge Owen asserts. Without question it was a reality--a legal
entity. This is evident frwq the very fact that people could
contract with it at all, because one camot contract with an
imagi:iary corporation or association any more than with an im-
aginary individual. But the fallacy lies in failing to distin-
guish between the actual existence of an association and its
legal status after it has been formed. Thus, in Williamson v.
Kokomo B. & L.Association,89 Ind. ,339, a case cited to sustain
the opinion in the above case, one Leach gave to an acting cor-
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poration his mortgage on real estate. Subsequent to the exe-
cution and recording of it, he executed another mortgage on the
same land to Williamson. In a proceeding to foreclose the
junior mortgage, Williamson maintained that the pretended corpora-
tion had no legal existence by reason of defective organization
and that the senior mortgage was void. lie v s for no reason
estopped from denying the corporate existence, but the court hela
that "this rule is not limited to cases where one by contract
-,mits corporate existence, but is a rule of general application."
Yet it is apparent that here too the question does not arise. It
does not matter what the exact legal status of the corporation
was, or whether the plaintiff could attack it. Whatever its
members may have been from a legal point of view, they had parted
with valuable property and taken a mortgage, and whatever name
or status the law may give them, they are still entitled to the
security of that mortgage. All the cases cited to sustain the
doctrine of the Society P)run case might be distinguished in the
sane way if space- permitted.(a) In every case in Ohio in which
the question has fairly arisen, it has been decided squarely upon
the ground of equitable estop,-el. The same principle was
(a) See Pope v. Capitol Bank, 20 Kan. ,440.
Thompson v. Candor,60 III. ,244.
16.
introduced into the New York law upon the grounds stated in
Henriques v. Dutch West India Co.(supra),and has been the basis
of all subsequent oecisions in that state. An examination of
a large number of cases arising in nearly every state shows that
the decisions are unifornly placed upon the ground of estoppel,
and the few cases that attempt to broaden the doctrine may be
easily distinguished.
Usurpation of Corporate Powers ; Contract Liability.
This leads to the next phase of the subjedt, viz., the lia-
bility of stockholders when no attempt whatever has been made
to conly with the statute, where individuals have simply formed
themselves into an association, elected officers, issued shares
of stock, business to be conducted and profits and losses to be
shared as in a de Jure corporation, and hold themselves out to
the world as such. It has not often arisen for determination
as the corporate existence is usually colorable, but it is fre-
quently asserted that such a concern is not a de facto corporation
within the meaning of the term, and for that reason a distinc-
tion is sought to be made between it and the class of associa-
tions just considered. From a stand-point of abstract morality
there is undoubtedly a diference, because in one case the best
of faith has been manifested, while in +ha other there has been
17.
a wilful misrepresentation. But such misrepresentation is not
material to thie contract, and does not operate as a fraud upon
the creditor to induce him to enter upon an agreement wbii ch he
wo-ald not otherwise have made, and froma legal stand-point I
fail to see anyT distinction. There are two things which it
is essential to show in order to establish a corporation de facto,
(I) The existence of a charter or some general law under which
a corporation with the powers assumed may be lawfully created,
and (2) A user by the party to the suit of the rights claimed
to be conferred by such charter or law.(a) It is only neces-
sary to show that by the laws of the state sui a corporation
might exist, and in Wood v. Jefferson County Bk. ,9 Cow. ,205, it
is held to be sufficient evidence to prove the existence of a
de facto corporation if the statute under which the allegedvcor-
poration might exist is read in court, and a user of franchises
in pursuance thereof proved. But whether or not the second
class of associations may be denominated de facto corporations
is at best only a useless quibble over terms, having nothing to
do with the legal aspect of the case. I am unable to discover
in reasoi or a;thority, where there is anT distinction between
(a) Eaton v. Walker, 43 N.W.Rep.,Ga.
Bank v. Sterns, 15 Wen&. ,314.
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the legal liability of members of the two classes of as3ocia-
tions. I am unable to see any line of reasoning applying in
one case that does not apply with equal force in the other. As
suggested at the beginning, there are but two grounds upon which
limited liability may be predicated, exemption by statute or
exemption by virtue of the particular contract. In neither case
can any statutory exemption be claimed, because in neither case
has there been a compliance with those conditions which the
statutes make essential. It does not matter that in one case
there has been a total disregard of conditions and in the other
only a partial disregard. Either is fatal. And the princi-
ple of estoppel applies equally. In each case the creditor has
acknowledged the corporate existence, has contracted with it
upon a corporate basis, agreeing upon a corporate liability-only,
and is estopped in the one case as in the other from afterward
repudiating the terms of his contract and enforcing another which
has never been made or contEnplated. But it is urged that such
a doctrine is against public policy, and it is asked, What is the
use of enacting laws if they need not be obeyed ? Why pre-
scribe conditions if there is no necessity for complying with
them ? If, as in some places it is made a penal offense,.
punishable as a misdemeanor, to usurp corporate functions, it
may perhaps change the aspect of the case4 In New York and
Ohio, and in most other states, the statutes contain various
19.
enactments by which officers an6. stockholders are rnaue individ-
ually liable for debts contracted in case of non-compliance wiith
certain requisites, but no provision is matIe by which such indi-
vidual liability attaches iy reason of any omission to organize
in the manner prescribed by law. The statutes prescri!De the
mode of organization, but annex no penalty or liability to the
neglect or omission to comply with it. Therefore the argmnient
is not affected, because precisely the same objections may be
urged and the same questions asked, whether the statute has been
violated entirely or partially, purposely or by mistake. As
has been already shown, the courts universally hold that an omis-
sion or other mistake caused by inadvertence does not render the
corporators liable,as partners, and therefore I conclude that
bpon the sane reasoning applied in those cases the same conclu-
sion must be reached, even though the whole organization be'a
bare-faced usurpation. If rights andcranchises have been
usurped they are the rights and franchises of the sovereign, and
of the sovereign only. The quetion has never been before
the highest court either of Ohio or of New York in this shape,
but it arises squarely in the case of Seacord v. Pendleton,55
Hun 579, where a bank purported to be a aDrporation and for a
long time did business as such though entirely unauthorized by
law, and the supreme courtwithout dissent, held the stockholders
20.
liable as incorporators only to a depositer who soug':t to estab-
lish a general partne ship among them. There is much aicta
to sustain the decision. In Booske v. Gulf Ice Co. ,5 So.Rep.,
(Fla),247 it is said :
"It is settled that a conveyance by a corporation will not
be treated as invalid merely because the corporation was
not formed under authority of' law. "
In Eqton v. Walker,43 !T.W.Rep. ,(MLich),638,the 'tockholders were
held liable as partners because there was no statute in exis-
tence tnder Ahich they could constitutional incorporate and could
not therefore claim to be a de facto corporation, but it is inti-
mated that it would be otherwlise had such a statute existed. See
also 3ank v. Stone,38 Mich.,779.
Reasoning Fiils Where Members are Actually Partners.
It will be understood that in this entire argument I
have assumed that the members of a de facto corporation are act-
ing as such among themselves ; that they are merely stockholders,
sharing profits and losses'as such and not as partners ; and
intefering in no way with the conduction of the business, for the
carrying on of which proper officers have been elected. Of
course, if as between themselves they are partners and act as
such they will be so liable to third persons. But in Bank v.
21.
Walker,06 N.Y. ,424 it was held that to establish a liability
against a party as a partner for the act of others, it must be
made to appear that a co-partnership was formed by express agree-
ment, or that there was an athorization in advance and a con-
sent to be bound by such acts as a partner, or a ratification of
the acts after performance, with full knowledge of all the cir-
cumstances, or some act by which anequitable estoppel has been
created. And in Fuller v. Rowe,57 IN.Y.,23 it was held, that
while parties assuming to act in a corporate capacity without a
legal organization as a corporate body are liable as partners
to those with whom they contract, to charge any one of them as
such, it must be shown that he was so acting at the time the
contract sued upon was made, or that Wpon some consideration he
agreed to become liable with the others.
This satisfactorily disposes of the question of con-
tract liability*
Liability for Torts.
The liability of stockholders for torts suffered by
third persons at the hands of the defectively organized corpora-
tion would seem to be an important question and one quite likely
to arise, yet the text-books fail entirely to discuss or mention
22.
it, and cases requiring its decision rarely appe' r in tie re-
ports. Its consideration, the , must be more upon reason than
uWon preceCLent,and I thimk may be quickly disposed of by following
the sa.ne lines that have been established in considering contract
liability. Suppose an agent or ai officer of the organization
commi±ss a tort upon the person or the property of a third party.
The tort is not ccrruitted with reference to any particular liabil-
ity, or in view of any particular legal status. The third party
h'is not recognized or admitted the corporate capacity to commit
the tort, and is not thus by his own acts estopped to deny the
corporate existence. The tort having been comitted, all con-
cerned should be held for just what they legally are. Every
individual owning stock in the alleged corporation has directly
or indirectly authorized, and is responsible for, the commission
of the tort, aid in sme capacity, either as an incorporator
or as a co-partner is liable therefor. It is certain that they
carniot claim the privilege of corporate liability only, because
they have never been legally incorporated. The terms of the
statutes from which such privileges are derived, and whose ob-
servance is a positive yre-requisite to legal existence, have not
been complied with. The only logical conclusion, then, is that
they must be held individually liable as joint tort feasors, a
conclusion entirely consistent with the theory of equitable
23.
estoppel already set forth. In some respects it is analagous
to the well settled principle of partne'ship which holds a secret
partner jointly liable with all oth.-r partners for contracts
made, or torts committed, while he was actually a member of the
firm, although the fact of his being such was unkno'n to the
third party at the time the contract was made or the tort commit-
ted. The point is amstained and well illustrated in the
case of Vredenburg v. Behan,33 La.Ann. ,627. Defendantq mem-
bers of a defectively incorporated club for "literary, scientif-
ic and charitable purposes" kept a bear chained upon their
premises. A. and his hired boy were passing and the boy teased
the bear by setting a dog on it? The bear slipped its collar
and attacked and wounded A.who died of his injury. The keep-
ing of the bear was within their corporate authority but their
incorporation having been defective, defendants were held indi-
vidually liable, even including one defendant who was away at the
time and altogether ignorant of their having the bear.(a) While
the ruae r raT prove harsh in individual cases, it seems consistent
with legal reasoning. k. ,
Recap itulat ion,
To recapitulate, I think the following propositions,
- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0----------------------
(a) See also Kruse v. Dusenbury,19 N.Y.,W1eekly Digest 201.
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founded in reason and established by authority, may be safely
laid down with a reasonable certainty of maintaining them'
1. Persons who, by contracting with a de facto corporation,
recognize aid acknowledge its corporate capacity to so
contract are estopped from afterward denying such corporate
capacity, and as to them it stands upon the same footing as
a corporation de Jure
2. Persons who have not so estopped themselves may, in any pro-
ceeding where it would be pertinent, question the regularity
of incorporation collaterally, and to them the members may
be made liable individually as co-partners or joint tort-
feasors, as the case may be ;
3. The state may at any time attack the legal existence of a
de facto corporation by bringing an action for that purpos.e
against the individuals composing it, to oust them from
their illegal user.
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